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Passkeys Explained: How Passwordless Login Works

How passkeys use FIDO2 and WebAuthn public-key cryptography, why they resist phishing, and the difference between synced passkeys and device-bound keys.

Short answer

A passkey is a login credential made of a key pair: the website keeps a public key, and your device keeps the private key and uses it to sign a challenge after you confirm with a fingerprint, face, or PIN. Because the passkey only works on the site that created it, a fake site cannot capture it.

Key takeaways

  • Passkeys are built on the FIDO2 standards, with WebAuthn as the browser API, and the server stores only a public key.
  • Each passkey is tied to one website's domain, so a lookalike phishing page has nothing to request or steal.
  • Synced passkeys follow you across devices through a credential manager, while device-bound passkeys (including hardware security keys) never leave one device.

Sign-in screens increasingly offer a "Use a passkey" button next to the password field. It replaces the thing you type with a cryptographic key that lives on your phone, computer, or a small USB key. This explainer covers what is happening behind that button, why it stops phishing, and which kind of passkey to choose.

What is a passkey?

A passkey is a pair of cryptographic keys created for one website, where the site stores the public half and your device guards the private half.

When you create a passkey, your device generates a new key pair just for that site. The public key goes to the website and sits in its account database. The private key stays with you, inside your phone's secure storage, your computer's credential manager, or a hardware security key. To use it, you confirm it is you the same way you open your device: fingerprint, face recognition, or a PIN.

The term comes from the FIDO Alliance, the industry group behind the standards. In the W3C Web Authentication specification, a passkey corresponds to a "discoverable credential," one the device can find on its own without you typing a username first.

How does signing in with a passkey work?

The website sends a random challenge, your device signs it with the private key, and the site checks the signature with the public key it already has.

The process, step by step:

  1. You open the sign-in page and choose the passkey option.
  2. The site sends a one-time random challenge through your browser.
  3. The browser passes the challenge to your authenticator along with the site's domain.
  4. You approve with a fingerprint, face, or PIN, which releases the private key for signing locally.
  5. The authenticator signs the challenge and returns the signature.
  6. The server verifies the signature against the stored public key and lets you in.

Nothing secret crosses the network. The challenge changes every time, so a recorded signature is useless later. And because the server only holds public keys, a breach of the site's database does not give attackers anything they can log in with. Compare that with passwords, where leaked hashes can be cracked and reused elsewhere.

The two standards doing the work are WebAuthn (the browser API published by the W3C, now at Level 3) and CTAP (the protocol between a browser and an external authenticator like a security key). Together they make up FIDO2.

Why are passkeys resistant to phishing?

A passkey is bound to the exact domain that created it, so a lookalike site cannot request it, and you have nothing to type into a fake form.

The WebAuthn specification scopes each credential to a "relying party," identified by its domain. Your browser tells the authenticator which domain is asking. If you land on "examp1e-login.com" instead of "example.com," the authenticator has no passkey for that domain and simply offers nothing.

NIST's current authentication guidance, SP 800-63B-4, draws the line clearly. Passwords, one-time codes, and SMS or push-based out-of-band methods are listed as not phishing-resistant, because a person can be tricked into entering or approving them on the wrong site. Verifier name binding, which is the mechanism WebAuthn uses, is listed as phishing-resistant. That is why passkeys sit at the top of our comparison of two-factor authentication methods.

What is the difference between synced and device-bound passkeys?

Synced passkeys are copied across your devices by a credential manager, while device-bound passkeys stay on a single device and cannot be exported.

Synced passkey Device-bound passkey
Where it lives Cloud-backed credential manager, copied to your signed-in devices One phone, computer, or hardware security key
Lose the device Restored on a new device after you sign in to the manager Lost with the device; you need another registered passkey
Phishing resistance Yes Yes
Typical use Everyday personal accounts High-security accounts, workplaces with strict policies
Allowed at NIST's highest assurance level (AAL3) No, because the key is exportable Yes, with a suitable hardware authenticator

Apple, Google, and Microsoft platforms, as well as several third-party password managers, offer synced passkeys. The FIDO Alliance notes that both types keep phishing resistance as a core property. The trade-off is about recovery and control: synced passkeys are easier to live with, and their security depends partly on how well the sync account itself is protected.

For most people, synced passkeys are the practical choice. Protect the account that syncs them with a strong passphrase (see how to create a strong password) and a second factor.

How do you start using passkeys?

Add a passkey from the security settings of an account you already have, then keep a second passkey or recovery method in case you lose a device.

A sensible order of work:

  1. Start with your primary email account, since it controls password resets for everything else.
  2. Add passkeys to your password manager account, then to financial and shopping accounts that support them.
  3. Register a second passkey on another device, or a hardware security key, for accounts you cannot afford to lose.
  4. Review saved sign-in methods once a year and remove old devices you no longer own.

If a site asks for a passkey on a shared or public computer, use the QR code option and approve on your phone rather than saving a passkey to that machine. And keep your devices updated, because the operating system and browser handle the protection of private keys; how to keep your devices updated covers the settings to check.

Frequently asked questions

What happens to my passkeys if I lose my phone?

If you use synced passkeys, they are restored when you sign in to the same credential manager on a new device. Device-bound passkeys on a lost device are gone, which is why sites let you register more than one passkey or keep a recovery method.

Does the website get my fingerprint or face data?

No. The biometric check happens locally and only releases the private key for use on your device. The website receives a signed response, not your fingerprint or face scan.

Can I use a passkey on a computer that does not have it?

Usually yes. Browsers can show a QR code that you scan with your phone, and the phone signs in for the computer after confirming the two devices are near each other over Bluetooth.

Should I delete my password after adding a passkey?

Many sites keep the password as a fallback, and some let you remove it. If you keep it, make it long and unique and store it in a password manager, since the password remains a phishing target.

Sources

  1. FIDO Alliance: Passkeys
  2. W3C: Web Authentication Level 3
  3. NIST SP 800-63B-4: Authentication and Authenticator Management

Research-based: Technorat does not claim hands-on testing. See how we research. Spotted an error? contact@technorat.com

#Passkeys#Passwords#Phishing#Privacy